posted
Okay Germany invaded on September 1st 1939 within a couple of weeks honoring their part of the agreement Soviet troops crossed the border. Now... When they did this why didn't the brits + french DoW the Soviets? Aren't they from a moral point of view equally responcible for the invasion of Poland? Though I can see it would've been the really stupid thing to do and would've garenteed their defeat and probably the British knew that they could've prevented this months even YEARS ago if they listened to Molotov's proposals for a joint allience of defence vs Germany. Thus felt too guilty or felt they'ld be too embarresed if someone pointed this out.
posted
Bluntly, Chamberlain and the French leader had been bamboozled by Hitler's propaganda into thinking that the Siegfried line - a few trenches and bunkers, manned by bugger-all - was a defensive work on the scale of thee Maginot Line. Moreover, they were emotionally geared up for fighting the Great War over again, trenches, vast casualties, and all. They remembered too well the many 'war-winning' offensives of 1914-18, and could not bring themselves to give the order for another such. Which is too bad, since it probably would have ended the war wuickly and cheaply, relative to the holocaust we actually had. Germany in 1940 didn't have the panzer or industrial strength for war with a French army not paralysed by blitzkrieg, especially while fighting the Poles at the same time.
In short, the Allies screwed up.
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posted
That would be a valid reason why not to DoW german pre 1939 but in 1939 the question is how come the Soviets weren't considered as bad as the Germans for also crossing the Polish border?
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King is correct, thought it is not fair to asy that the Allies screwed up, since there were no allies, per se. It was Chamberlain and the other European leaders who did not want to go to war again.
Hitler simply out maneuvered the rest of Europe and gambled that he would get the reaction he got. He knew that Britain and France would not go to war over Poland. It is frustrating because the French actually had the largest stading army in Europe at the time and could have handled Germany in a ground war (Blitzkrieg not withstanding)
Maginot mentality and fear of bloodshed paralyzed the French. What was most ironic was the fact that the vaunted Maginot line was simply gone around when the Germans invaded France. The old Prussian generals were no fools and could read a map, and decided why try to fight our way through this when we could go through the forest and simply go around? Duh!
A note about the brave Polish army. It fought HARD for 30 days! On its own, undermanned, out-gunned and certainly overmatched both in leadership and technology they fought for their lives waiting for their allies to come. It is one of the more shameful things to have happened in the war. Of course the British and French declared war, but did essentially nothing. I have read accounts of Polish soldiers attacking German positions on horseback with pikes!!!
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quote:He knew that Britain and France would not go to war over Poland.
Quite so, and he was wrong.
quote:This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German Government a final note stating that unless we heard from them by 11.00 a.m. that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us.
I have to tell you that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany.
As for going around the Maginot line, the French weren't that stupid either. They put their best soldiers in the gap. Had the line extended to the coast, they would have needed so many soldiers to man it that they'd have no field army. And they can hardly be blamed for not realising the Ardennes were passable by large-scale mechanised forces.
Finally, the Poles did not charge tanks on horseback. They were brave, but not stupid. What happened was that the cavalry in question had just surprised and charged some German infantry, and very successfully too, routing them. Unfortunately, some German tanks came up behind the cavalry, cutting off their retreat; in order to get away from the machine guns, they took the shortest path - throught the tanks. An Italian journalist misread the situation, the Germans saw that his misunderstanding could be good propaganda, and the rest is an urban legend that has lasted more than fifty years.
I don't understand what you mean by 'there were no Allies.' Certainly there were, to wit, Britain, France, and Poland. Just because the US wasn't in yet (slowpokes that they are) doesn't mean there was no alliance.
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quote:Originally posted by Sid Meier: That would be a valid reason why not to DoW german pre 1939 but in 1939 the question is how come the Soviets weren't considered as bad as the Germans for also crossing the Polish border?
I think the Americans were pretty upset about this, but our neutrality at the time gave us little voice. You see Hitler and Stalin had made a pact, though if I remember correctly it did not involve Poland. This was Hitler acting unilaterally and catching Joseph off guard. Stalin's justification for invading was to save Poland from being swallowed up by Germany. He simply decided not to give it back.
What most people don't realize today is that Stalin and Hitler were in cahoots before '39. As part of the Versailles treaty, Germany had to disband its army. What they did, in fact, was get rid of their elisted corp (excepting key non-coms). They reduced in rank all of the professional soldiers and kept them around as essentially the police/defence force. When they needed to begin training again they did so on Russian soil. The Blitzkreig strategy was developed and perfected in Russia! What Stalin got in return for allowing this was technological assistance and a "guarantee" that Germany would not attack the Soviet Union or encroach into its border states. Hitler of course used this treaty for all it was worth and eventually betrayed Stalin.
The history of why Operation Barbarosa (the attack on the USSR) failed is fascinating. We hear about the battle of Stalingrad as the turning point, but that battle would have never happend if not for Mussolini's inept handling of the southern front. Read Ciano's diaries for a first hand account. Ciano was Mussolini's son in law and trusted advisor.
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"And they can hardly be blamed for not realising the Ardennes were passable by large-scale mechanised forces."
Not be blamed??? They built and maintained the roads!!! Surely it occured to someone that German panzers could use it. It was a failure of the top command not to prepare for that contingency.
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"I don't understand what you mean by 'there were no Allies.' Certainly there were, to wit, Britain, France, and Poland. Just because the US wasn't in yet (slowpokes that they are) doesn't mean there was no alliance. "
Just semantics, I was thinking in terms of an Allied fighting force rather than participants in the agreement.
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posted
The French standing army was much larger than the Wehrmacht. Had they gone east, Hitler's Recih would have collapsed in short order. As you said, he was gambling on the British and French not wanting to fight over Poland, and to an extent they were right : The French were willing to declare war, but not to send in the large-scale offensive they had promised.
As for the roads in the Ardennes, obviously the department responsible for roads didn't speak to the department responsible for war plans... But more to the point, I think you are underestimating the amount of traffic a division, particularly an armoured division, on the move generates. Now it's true that there were some officers who warned that the Germans could attack through the Ardennes, Liddell-Hart among others (or so he claimed after the war.) So my 'cannot be blamed' was perhaps a little too strong. Still, failing to guess where the enemy will attack is hardly unusual.
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posted
He's a physicist, but KoM has earned the benefit of the doubt on European history.
If it's a subject I know about, he's always been right. When it's been a subject I don't know about that I've bothered to look up, he's generally been right.
That's for knowledge of events - we differ greatly on some interpretations of motivations and causes. But if you want to know who had a bigger army when, KoM seems to be a reliable source.
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posted
Actually the Prussian General Staff also though along the same lines as the French and considered the Ardennes unpassable. It was only Gudarian having served there in WWI who said it was passable. Thus after the war plans (that followed along the similar lines as the Siffelin plan) were captured by the french the Manstein Plan after some bullying by Hitler was accepted instead. The failure to see the Ardennes as passable is I think is just the usual High Command senior officer incompetence for it to be anything else would suggest a conspiracy.
Now what you say about the Molotov-Rippentrop Pact is incorrect here:
Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
The Government of the German Reich and The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April, 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following Agreement:
Article I. Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other Powers.
Article II. Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third Power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third Power.
Article III. The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.
Article IV. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of Powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.
Article V. Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.
Article VI. The present Treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not advance it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this Treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.
Article VII. The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The Agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.
[The section below was not published at the time the above was announced.]
Secret Additional Protocol.
Article I. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.
Article II. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish States and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.
Article III. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinteredness in these areas.
Article IV. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.
Moscow, August 23, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich v. Ribbentrop
Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R. V. Molotov
*******
Now the Blitzkrieg tactics originally came from England but resistence by the Cavalry sympathetic High Command prevented the theory from being taken in fully same as in France and more so in Poland. Germany put slightly more emphasis on it since the need to end a war quickly was far more enherent in Hitler's and generally the the OKW mind's, but it was Gudarian and his publication of "Actung Panzer" that started the trend and his suggestions that allowed the 30 overrunning of Poland.
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I blew it on the Polish article. It has been a while since reading that stuff. I was certain that Germany broke the rules when attacking Poland and forced the action of the USSR.
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Your comments on Blitzkrieg are fair enough for Britain and France, but the Poles rejected it not out of conservatism but poverty. They just couldn't afford to maintain a large mechanised or armoured force, and consequently had no doctrine for them.
Incidentally, a slightly similar situation existed in Norway. The Norwegian army in 1940 had one (obsolete) tank, bought in so that, and I quote, "the soldiers can see one while they are in the service". Of course, Norway had the advantage of mountains, rivers, and essentially no roads, which is why we fought longer than the Poles. Had our government, or the British expeditionary force, shown even the smallest amount of competence, we'd have thrown the Germans back into the sea, or at least confined them to the south. If I could go back in time, Nygaardsvold would be standing right next to Quisling in front of that firing squad.
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wait.... didn't the Norweigans have a week to mobilize their troops? But ya wans't norwya between a rock and hard place? With the Allies preparing to land and take key ports to prevent Swedish iron ore to be shipped to Germany and your trade routes being mined? Just saying.
Also, the Russian sent aid not to Nazi Germany in their military build up but aided the Weimar Republic in creating what would one day become the Luftwaffe. I don't know about the organization of the Panzer Division, I'm certain that was more recent around 1938 then 1920's.
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Blitzkrieg tactics probably predate the Brits Fuller and Hart if one wants to spend the time searching for the appropriate reference. Guderain certainly was the German officer who implemented the concept. The tactics were taught and fine-tuned on Soviet soil prior to 1936 and field tested in Spain diruing the civil war and finally implented to great effect in Poland and North Africa.
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This is off topic, but what sort of physics do you study? I recently heard a talk at Fermi Nat'l Labs on kaons (K-TEV exeriment-I have a colleague on the research team). Fascinating stuff! Makes me wish I knew more math.
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I'm thinking more of the organization of the Panzer division of when it was actually organized I have a book about the history of teh German Army I'm going to leaf through it when I find it.
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posted
Yeah, France, Russia, and Germany (Patton took a page from the book!) I guess we could even add Korea (both sides used some variant) and Iraq (Desert Storm)
I suppose there are a finite number of ways to use a mobile/mechanized force in a fight.
posted
Well, yes, we were lucky that the Germans got to us first, or we might have ended up on the wrong side. But as for having a week to mobilise our troops - hah. We got a few days' warning from, IIRC, a contact at a German embassy, maybe the Danish one. The Nygaardsvold government refused to believe it, expecting the Great Powers to respect our neutrality.
Then came the invasion. Though the most incredible good luck, our ancient batteries in Oscarsborg (installed in preparation for war with Sweden, in 1905!) managed to sink the German cruiser Blucher, delaying the occupation of Oslo by a few critical hours and enabling the government to flee.
Government and Storting come to a stop at Elverum, where they discuss what to do. The mood is for surrender until the King puts some spine into them - that veto is one reason both he and his son were such unifying symbols for Norway after the war. The most famous image of King Haakon is one where he and his son stand under a birch about to break into full leaf. They are both looking steadily at the viewer, clearly understanding that they have committed to a war they have little hope of winning, but not about to surrender to the Nazis. Or perhaps I'm reading my own feelings into the picture. In any case, it is to these birches Nordahl Grieg is referring when he writes "Today, the flagpole stands naked / 'midst Eidsvold's springtime greens. / But in this very hour / we know what freedom means." My favourite war poem.
But I digress. Having decided to fight, the next step is obviously to mobilise the army. Now there are two kinds of mobilisation procedures in Norway at this time. There is "partial and secret", to be announced by a letter to each man called up, with a muster time a few days hence. And then there is "general and open", announced by telephone, radio, public proclamation, and anything else one can think of. Clearly the former is intended for when the government has a bit of warning, and doesn't want to provoke whoever they fear is going to invade; the latter is for emergencies. Our esteemed Defense Minister, however, is so incompetent that he doesn't know the difference. He orders partial and secret mobilisation, with the enemy standing on Norwegian soil!
Fortunately the general population is a bit more on the ball. A journalist hears that the Government has ordered mobilisation, and announces it on the radio; in spite of no official announcement having been made, many reservists go to their muster points. There they find rifles in short supply, and ammunition even shorter, the Labour government of the 30s having decided that there weren't going to be any more wars. (Remember the Defense Minister from the last paragraph? He was a member of Broken Rifle, the ultra-pacifist organisation who campaigned for Norway to disband its army. Clearly a highly qualified man.)
The disorganised army puts up a reasonable resistance under the circumstances, but is quickly driven from the major cities. There is no fighting in the streets, and very little on the army depots; the surprise is just too overwhelming. However, Norway has a long militia tradition, and the Germans are unable to immediately press their advantage into the mountains, or even very far up the great valleys in the East. Miserable roads, a small German force, heavy naval losses, and roadblocks at every turn (and there are a lot of turns in a Norwegian road!) conspire to keep the Germans confined to the cities.
There's only so long rifles and machine guns will hold out against tanks and total air superiority, though. The Norwegians are forced north in a long fighting retreat; it is clear that the only real hope for successful resistance is British intervention. However, there is every hope of that; now that the Royal Navy is alerted to its danger, surely they can keep the Kriegsmarine (already badly mauled in the first days of the campaign) at bay at least in the North Sea, cut off supplies to the German forces in Bergen, Trondhjem, and the other coastal cities, and land a strong expeditionary force to push the Germans into the sea?
Well, you would think so. Unfortunately the Chamberlain government can't quite make up its mind what the target is. One day their forces (packed pell-mell into transports, vital equipment dumped in with no order, nobody quite knows what is on which ship...) is being ordered to Narvik. The next it is reorganised, to battalions being subtracted for French garrison duty. The next they are ordered to Trondhjem. When they finally arrive, nobody speaks Norwegian; the dictionaries are all in Finnish (the force having been intended to rescue Finland, and incidentally, Finnish is not at all closely related to Norwegian, in fact it's not even a Indo-European language!), and in the end the liaison officers are forced to communicate with their Norwegian counterparts in German! The Spitfires land on a frozen lake, where they first freeze in place (spring day followed by sharp frost in the night), and are then bombed by the Germans. So much for air superiority.
And even with all of that, even when driven out of the south, we managed to retake Narvik and drive the German garrison (reinforced, incidentally, by "troops on leave" travelling on Swedish trains) there across the Swedish border, and might have turned that into a general counteroffensive southwards - there weren't that many Germans, and their logistics were awful, what with Royal Navy raids - when the news comes of the Blitzkrieg into France. And the British, French, and Polish troops are withdrawn, to die uselessly at Sedan, or lose their heavy equipment at Dunkirk. Heavy equipment without which our one remaining army cannot mount an offensive; there is only so much that can be done with rifles and courage. There is nothing left for Ruge, our new Commander-in-Chief (the old one was fired for suggesting immediate surrender in the days just after the invasion) can do but surrender, after having ensured King and Government are safely in British exile. Were it up to me, I might have left the Government to be shot by the Germans, but then I'm not a soldier.
Gah. And this is the government that were hailed as heroes on their return; after withholding the pay of our merchant marine for five years on the pretext of creating a fund for after the war - a fund which was never paid to the survivors. Quisling at least had the courage of his convictions. Shoot the lot of them, I say.
EDIT : johnsonweed, I study particle physics, though SLAC where I work is more into B-mesons than kaons. Only the egg-headed theorists need to know math, though - us experimentalists stick to hacking.
[ June 07, 2005, 09:17 PM: Message edited by: King of Men ]
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posted
Here you go, King Haakon on the left, Prince Olav on the right. Hmm, I remember them looking out of the photograph, but it seems I was wrong.
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It is amazing how little we in the US hear about the "other" countries involved in WWII. I took a course in the political history of the war that was taught by Dutchman who fought with the Dutch resistance as a young man. He tried to emphasize that it was a global conflict and had us read a lot of material that emphasized that point. His stories of tying explosives to bridges were incredible!
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posted
Here's a poem Grieg (our war poet) wrote about that image. He was also in Molde (I remembered the place wrong) at the time, being bombed.
quote:Slik vil Kongen leve for oss: Ved en sølvblek bjørkestamme, mot en naken vårskogs mørke, står han ensom med sin sønn. Tyske bombefly er over.
Slitets tunge, trette furer i hans ansikt er hans egne. Smerten i det gjelder andre. Slik må fredens ansikt være, grått og dradd av nattevåk, haget, pint, forhånt av voldsmakt, men allikevel med styrken til å lide med alt liv.
Han og bjørken hører sammen. Som de døde er med mulden er hans sjel blitt ett med landet. Mannens rene, vare smerte, stammens hvite, stille lys, ser en dag de ikke kjente. Noe fint og skjult skal krenkes. Noe grovt og ondt skal komme.
Over smerten, sår og hudløs. lukker der seg strengt en vilje. Slik må fredens ansikt være, dirrende av spente sener, i en hård forakt for mordet, i et vern for alt den elsker.
Rak og høy står han ved bjørken, stirrende mot det som kommer, ørne-ensom, ørne-stolt.
Da de tyske overfalt oss og bød trelldom, svarte Kongen at han nektet for seg selv. Men det var hans folk som hadde valget; bare det fikk svare.
Ingen presset ham i kampen, ingen tryglet han om støtte. Sky og var for andres skjebne, angst for andres rett å leve - siden hver må dø alene - stod han, uten krav, og ventet.
Aldri var vårt land så øde: veier stengt og byer lammet, det var langt fra sinn til sinn. var det ikke som hvert hjerte fikk lagt valgets byrde på seg, bevende: hva skal jeg gjøre?
Blekt og stille traff de valget, først hans råd, og siden folket.
Første svaret kom fra havet. Førti tusen norske sjøfolk, en for alle, valgte strid, valgte hjemløshet og lengsel, valgte flammedød og koldbrann, valgte drift på spinkle flåter tusen ville mil fra hjelpen; evig heder skal de ha!
Men de valgte det de kjente, dekk og dørk, sitt eget arbeid.
De som gikk i krigen hjemme valgte det de ikke kjente, valgte det de ikke kunne. men de fant seg vei mot fienden, fra fabrikken og kontoret, fiskebåten, skolepulten; oftest fikk de ingen ordre uten den de ga seg selv.
Snøen brånet, bjørken spratt. Rugden trakk i månenatten. Tyske tanks var sør i dalen.
med sitt hode fullt av våronn gikk en mann nedover bygden, han bar giftering på fingren, det var lukt av hest i klærne. Luften mellom ham og stuen der hvor barnene og konen stod og stirret, øket svimmelt til et isrum hvor han sank.
Det var far som gikk i krigen.
Mange var som ikke gikk.
Kornet modnes sent her nordpå, stampes ikke frem av jorden.
Så kom nederlagets time. Kongen og de få som fulgte, seilte hjemløse fra landet, langsmed kystens siste øyer der hvor vårens hvite sjøfugl nettopp hadde endt sin lange, lengselsdrevne reise hjem.
Landet lå igjen, alene.
Men det såkorn som var kastet inn i hvert et nakent hjerte på en blek, forpint aprildag vokste gjennom høstens mørke: det var selv en måtte velge.
Tapt og hjelpesløs var ingen: hver var ensom med det største, hver var ensom med seg selv.
Over jordens overflate myldret landets nye herrer. Vold og hykleri var paret, og de kalte seg for gartner når de bare var en lusepest ynglende om folkets røtter, giftig, gravende og grådig: hvor er frihet, finn den, drep den.
Det ble ikke tungt å velge. Tusen seilte over sjøen, trosset bombefly og dødsdom, storm og hav de ikke kjente på en liten fiskeskøyte, færingsbåt gikk også an.
Da de kom iland på kaien, ba de straks om mere fare; jagerfly var alltid drømmen, og de brente etter kampen som en elsker mot sin elskte.
Mange fikk det som de ville, og de flyr idag Kanalen til sitt ville stevnemøte.
Nød og terror ble i landet. Alt ble plyndret og besmittet. men det siste egentlige: menneskesinnet fikk de ikke.
Barnene stod først i striden: det var vekstens eget opprør. kanskje barn har mest å verge, siden de skal leve lengst.
Presset øket, hver fikk svare: hva han mente med sitt liv. Sa han at han mente noe, ble han fengslet, slått og martret av en flokk med syke treller i den hatefulle angsten for en frihet som de aldri lærte av en førertrell.
Kornet modnes sent her nordpå. Mannen, ensom med sitt indre, velger langsomt, han må kjenne hva han tror på, hvem han er, men så føler han en lykke ved at valget er hans eget, gjennomprøvet, gjennomlidt. Friheten er grodd i frihet, alt er hans, fra rot til blomstring. Han har retten til sin tanke, dyrebar som hjemmets jord.
Fengslets bleke pinte menn synger når de går i døden.
Nå er akeren blitt moden.
Engang var det få rundt Kongen. Nå står han og folket sammen, og nå stiger det fra somme dette underlige ropet: du er fører, du er høvding, og vi selv er kongehirden.
Hvorfor er det at de velger ord fra våre fienders språk? Fører, før oss, og vi følger. Er det angsten for å tenke, er det trangen til å velte alle byrder på en annen?
Skyldes ikke verdens nød at den tenkte altfor dårlig? Skal vårt bidrag til dens frelse være det: å ikketenke? Men det tankeløse ropet skuler noe urettferdig, noe blindt og grusomt mot ham.
Førerskapet ofrer andre, blodig må dets byrde være; den skal Kongen være fri.
Ingen mann i dødens kval i en livbåts frost på havet, eller siste natt i cellen kan fortvilet rope til ham: hvorfor har du ført oss hit?
De vil huske ham med godhet, som en venn og som en felle. De gikk selv sin gang mot døden, for de valgte, de som han.
Han som stod ved bjørkestammen i sitt hemmelige slektskap med den bleke vår omkring seg, hadde smertelig en ømhet for alt liv som skulle gro. Ydmyk har han sett det vokse dit hvor hver mann er alene, dit hvor friheten blir døden.
Han er mere enn en fører, for han trodde på de andre, sinnets eget kongerike.
Mot en fremtid skal han gå, for han selv har mere frihet i sitt hjerte enn de fleste. Derfor er han folkekongen i et land hvor hver skal være fører for sin egen skjebne, høvding i sitt eget sinn.
I imagine the Norwegian doesn't help you much, so in my (horrible) translation :
Thus the King will live in our minds : By a silver-pale birch, against a naked spring forest's deep, he stands, alone with his son. German bombers overhead.
The heavy, tired furrows of work in his face are all his own. The pain belongs to others. This must be the face of peace, grey and drawn from night-waking, tortured, mocked by might, yet still with strength to suffer with all life.
He and the birch belong together. As the dead become one with earth his soul has joined the country's. The pure, silent pain of the man, the white, quiet light of the tree, see a day they did not know. A fine, hidden secret will be violated. A brutal evil arrives.
Over pain, raw and skinless, a strong will closes strictly. This must be the face of peace, thrumming with tense sinew, hard with contempt for murder, protecting all it loves.
Straight and tall he stands by the birch, gazing at what is to come, eagle-lonely, eagle-proud.
When the Germans fell upon us, offering slavery, the King gave answer : He refused - for himself. But his people had the choice; only they could answer.
No man he forced into battle, no man he begged for aid. Shy, wary of others' fate, the right of others to live - for we each must die alone - he stood, demanding nothing, waiting.
Never was our country so bleak. Roads closed and cities paralysed, long the way from mind to mind. Was it not as though each heart felt the burden of choice, quivering : What shall I do?
Pale, quiet, they gave their answer, first his council, then the people.
First the answer from the sea. Forty thousand Norwegian sea-men, one for all, chose to fight. Chose homelessness and home-longing, chose flame-death and gangrene, chose drifting in frail rafts a thousand wild miles from aid eternal honour to them!
Still, they chose what they knew, deck and bulkhead, their own work.
Those who went to war at home chose what they did not know, chose what they did not master. Still they found their way foe-wards, from factory and office, trawler, school-desk, oftenest with no order but what they gave themselves.
Snow crumbles, birches bloom. Rugden flies in moon-night. German tanks south in the valley.
Head full of spring-sowing a man walks down the road wedding-ring on his finger smell of horse in his clothes. The air between him and the hut where children and wife stand staring, increases dizzily becomes an ice-gap where he sinks.
Father, going to war.
Many did not go.
Corn ripens slowly in the north, is not hurried forth by earth.
Came the hour of defeat. King, and those few who followed, sailed homeless from the land along the last islands where the spring's white sea-birds had just ended their long longing-driven journey home.
The land was left, alone.
But the seed that was thrown into each naked heart on that bleak, pained April day grew through autumn darkness : Each, himself, had the choice.
Lost and helpless was no man; each was lonely with the greatest; each was lonely with himself.
Over the Earth crawled the land's new lords. Might and hypocrisy joined, gardeners they called themselves, though they were only a louse-pest breeding in the people's roots, poisonous, digging, greedy : Where is freedom, find it, kill it.
It was not heavy to choose. A thousand sailed across the sea, defying bombers and headsman, storm and sea they did not know, in a small trawler, faering would also do.
Landing on the quay, always more danger they asked, fighter aircraft was the dream, and they burned for battle as a lover for his beloved.
Many got their wish and today fly the Channel for their wild rendesvouz.
Need and terror stayed in the country. All was plundered and besmirched, except the last, ultimate : Human minds they could not take.
Children stood first in battle, rebellion of growth itself. Perhaps they have the most to lose, as they are to live the longest.
Pressure increased, each gave answer : What did he mean by his life. If he said, he meant something, he was jailed, beaten, martyred by the flock of sick thralls in their hate-filled fear of the freedom they never learned from a Fuhrer-thrall.
Corn ripens slowly in the North.
Man, alone with his soul, chooses slowly, he must feel what he believes in, who he is, but then he knows a joy in that the choice is his truly-tried, truly-suffered. Freedom has grown in freedom, all is his, from root to flower. He has the right to his thought, precious as his home's soil.
Prison's pale tortured men sing as they go to death.
The corn is ripe.
Once there were few around the king. Now he and his people stand together, and there rises in some this curious cry : you are fuhrer (*), you are chieftain, and we - the King's Guard.
Why do they choose words from our enemy's tongue? Fuhrer, lead us, and we follow. Is it fear of thinking, is it need to give all burdens to another man?
Is not the world's plight caused by its thinking badly? Shall our part of its deliverance be this : To notthink? But the thoughtless cry hides deep injustice blind and cruel to him.
Fuhrer-dom sacrifices others, bloody its burden must be; of this let the King go free.
No man in death-pain in a life-boat's frost asea, or the final night in prison may despairing shout to him why have you brought us here?
They will recall him with goodness, as a friend and as a comrade. They went their own way to death, for they chose - the same as him.
He that stood by the birch-tree, in his hidden kinship with the pale spring, surrounding, had painfull tenderness for all life which should grow. Humbly he has seen it rising to where each man stands alone, there where freedom becomes death.
He is more than a Fuhrer, for he had faith in others, the kingdom of the mind.
To a future he will go for he has himself more freedom in his heart than most. Therefore he is the people's king in a land where each shall be fuhrer of his fate, chieftain of his mind.
August 1942
(*) Norwegian being a Germanic language, we have a word "fører" which is cognate to German "Fuhrer", leader. Since the English word "leader" lacks a lot of the connotations, I translate to Fuhrer to make it clear what Grieg is talking about.
Whew, that was quite a job!
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posted
Okay I was reading a book on the Red Army and they entered Poland as "liberators" I geuss you could say that the allies may have thought that it would be better for the Poles under Soviet rather then Nazi occupation.
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