posted
A cosmic or overarching absolute Morality would contain within it the ability to answer every question of what a person should do given a particular set of facts.
The relvance doesn't depend on whether the courses of action it advocates provides you with a benefit.
posted
"The relvance doesn't depend on whether the courses of action it advocates provides you with a benefit."
Hm. I think here we start getting into the definition of "benefit." Since we have to use the system itself to produce this concept, surely the fact that you should do it means that it is, by the definition of the system, beneficial? It may not be immediately beneficial to you, but there is a benefit nonetheless within the definition used by the system.
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posted
OK, then I think you're original contention that this is "utilitarian" is largely pointless, because by that definition all morality would be "utilitarian."
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I think most people who subscribe to Utilitarianism would argue that all morality is in this sense utilitarian. That they are right does not, however, mean that Utilitarianism is necessarily a superior form of morality.
The distinction you're making -- that in a system of "cosmic" morality the mere mortals subscribing to that system cannot perceive the benefit -- is a valid one. That doesn't mean that they don't still have faith in a benefit, however.
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posted
Acting in accordance with the moral law is its own end, not for the sake of some other payoff. If you are itching for something, I can give you the dignity of man, but then, that's another tautology as the dignity of man is concomitant with acting in accordance with the moral law.
posted
You're quoting Kant, but it's worth noting that Kant provided a reason for why he felt that acting in accordance with moral law was itself the highest moral law. And that reason is, in fact, a payoff.
Let's see if I remember my old philosophy classes:
Postulate One: All things go bad except good intentions. Conclusion One: Good intentions are the purest form of good, since unlike any form of action they cannot go bad or produce anything bad in and of themselves.
But, then, what constitutes a good intention? Kant replies that a "good" intention is one that is mindful of the duty a person owes to humanity and the universe in general, this duty being an inherent moral reality. Which is, of course, where Kant breaks down into "because I said so," making the whole rest of the discussion pointless.
posted
Satisfying one's sense of duty to the universe IS a payoff, Irami. Moreover, if like Kant you believe that the universe benefits from this sacrifice, there's a further payoff down the line.
posted
Irami, I dig your responsibility/duty-based notion of morality. I understand its source, have been trained in its evolution within philosophy, blah blah blah. I even, on a personal level, try to incorporate elements of it in my personal morality (hence my profession). HOWEVER, duty is not cosmic or transcendental, because human society and culture defines what duty is. In fact, the concept makes little sense beyond the confines of society and its codes. So, once again, though I am behind you one-hundred per cent in your centering your morals on duty, you are in an untenable position if you wish to convince anyone that they ought to do the same because cosmically that's what people "ought" to do, because every one of these arguments has boiled down to the cold hard fact that there is no "ought" without a transcendental being doling it out.
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quote:But, then, what constitutes a good intention? Kant replies that a "good" intention is one that is mindful of the duty a person owes to humanity and the universe in general, this duty being an inherent moral reality. Which is, of course, where Kant breaks down into "because I said so," making the whole rest of the discussion pointless.
The is more to Kant's defintiion of the good than this. He argues that the good can be derived from the nature of rationality -- that is, that within defining what it means to be rational is contained all the axioms to establish all moral duties. "The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception, and not the expected effect, determines the will."
You can argue with Kant over whether goodness should be tied to rationality, but that's a step removed from "it's good because I say it is." Rather, "it's good because to do otherwise would be irrational, and that which is rational is moral."
[Rereading this, the question comes to mind: WHat's the difference, and why should anyone draw the distinction? I think it's a matter of (for me) wanting to appreciate the richness of a moral theory (religious or secular) and feeling physical pain at seeing Kant's theory reduced to a soundbie format. That is a personal pain, though, likely driven by my own desire not to have wasted 3 year of my life. *grin]
*nod* Which is, again, "because I say so." Especially when he defines "rational" as "in accordance with moral law, which is defined as all those things which are rational." This is why I used the term "tautology" a bit earlier.
I've always been unimpressed with Kant's argument, to be honest. It's not that I disagree with his sense of the importance of the intention, but rather that "the will" even as a motivating factor is not itself a moral force.
posted
I have edited with my confession of my own vested interest, Tom. Still, I'd argue that the extra steps shouldn't be left out. There is arbitrariness, but at another level.
I was not impressed by Kant until having to write my third or fourth contra-paper. By arguing against him repeatedly, I came to appreciate the theory more. This may, however, be a form of self-delusion akin to belief-based self-hypnosis. That is, maybe I read the "holy text" so many times and with a mind and heart so open to it that conversion was inevitable.
posted
(I am also at another conference and although it is useful and interesting stuff, my brain is turning to pudding.)
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posted
It certainly is a useful starting point, but things will quickly get mucked up if you then try to go from there to claim rationality per force, because of its transcendental importance "ought" to be the basis of morality. Rationality is, at bottom, an epistemological approach (granted, it's the one that most accurately can predict and report actions in the physical world). To take this "way of knowing" and reify it (or even use it as ontological framework, like a moral code, for example) is just fine, but there isn't any REQUIREMENT that we do so. What I am challenging people to demonstrate is why a particular moral code MUST be based on (take your pick) rationality, utility, divine revelation, responsibility, etc. No one has ever answered this to my satisfaction, unfortunately, not Kant, not Aristotle, not Irami.
[ February 15, 2005, 04:03 PM: Message edited by: David Bowles ]
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Here is Kant's leap of faith, I think. I'd argue that he sees our rationality as that part of us which was made in God's image.
I don't take that leap, myself, but I do think rationality has to base intercontextual human moral systems, as it is the only method which bridges human contexts. (Of course, there are human cultures which do not value rationality, but rather privilege other ways of knowing (intuition, direct enlightenment, etc.), but I don't see how there can be a bridge between differing non-rational approaches.) Thus I'd argue that it [best] meets Tom's minimal unit test for maximizing usefulness, [a least provisionally].
posted
I think Descartes tried, David, by arguing that rationality is the one thing we can be sure exists, since merely being able to ask the question demonstrates its existence.
The downside, of course, is that what Kant means by "rationality" is actually "practicality," and I think the Utilitarians handle practicality arguments a bit better.
(Edit: hey, CT and I said the same thing in a completely different way. *laugh*)
posted
" Rationality is, at bottom, an epistemological approach (granted, it's the one that most accurately can predict and report actions in the physical world)."
"What I am challenging people to demonstrate is why a particular moral code MUST be based on (take your pick) rationality, utility, divine revelation, responsibility, etc."
Any moral code that values acting in accordance with actual events (a set of particular moral codes) must be based on rationality, because rationality is, as you stated, the best method for predicting and reporting actual events.
[ February 15, 2005, 04:21 PM: Message edited by: Paul Goldner ]
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quote:The downside, of course, is that what Kant means by "rationality" is actually "practicality,"
How so? *interested
[Edit: Yeah, yeah, yeah. We're always going off and saying the same thing differently, Tom. You know that. The only difference is, you also have the mad music and IT skillz. *shakes fist in jealous rage]
posted
Because the implication of "rationality" being the equivalent of "moral law" is that the rational choice -- in other words, the choice that someone with perfect knowledge and perfect intention would make -- is also the practical choice. A "rational" approach to morality would seem to me to argue that certain behaviors should be self-evident by a form of "natural law," which if perfectly understood produces perfect intention -- even if perfect behavior is somehow impossible. And awareness of the impossibility of perfect behavior, once it informs the perfect intention, produces practicality.
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posted
I'm not sure I could reduce the various formulations of the categorical imperative to [mere] practicality, though. Sure, that which can serve as a moral action must be informed by practicality, but I don't think it reduces to it.
I'll try to work it out in my head, though, and see if I can swing the reduction for the various formulations.
(I so miss philosophy! What a lovely thread. Thank you all for a delightful and stimulating conversation. Back to conferencing for me.)
quote:Any moral code that values acting in accordance with actual events (a set of particular moral codes) must be based on rationality, because rationality is, as you stated, the best method for predicting and reporting actual events.
Okay, now we're getting somewhere. Kind of. Of course what we need to address at this point is why morality needs to be based on an epistemology that's good at reporting with verisimilitude. What is it about morality that requires the most accurate picture of the world? Is it that morality governs our interactions with that world?
Do we want to say that, given that morality governs human interactions with a world peopled with real objects, that moral code is "objectively better" which can accurately observe, record and respond to those objects with verisimilitude? Does anyone have a major objection to that wording?
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posted
Nope. I think 3 or 4 years ago in a conversation with my mother, I said that any action that is not taken in accordance with what is true can not be a morally correct action. While I don't actually believe that completely anymore, I think its true ENOUGH that I agree with your statement.
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posted
(Though I suppose I should point out for newer members, that the last time David and I argued about meta-ethics, we realized we actually have approximately teh same position).
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Which at first baffled many people, and continues to be a source of worry for others, especially those whose faith in my intelligence was shaken by my voting for Bush, heh.
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posted
This stuff about ethics is interesting to me (obviously, or else I'd be in a different line of work). But I wonder how crucial it is to answering the entire question posed by Geoff Card.
Geoff's question seemed to be in two parts:
(i) Is there objective right/wrong? (ii) To what extent should right/wrong influence laws?
My own answer to (i) is definitely "yes," but I'm unsure about the details. Ethics is tricky business, especially if one doesn't believe in God. Kantian or utilitarian systems have their appeal, but each is frought with problems. Evolutionary systems, or the idea that morality is "biologically/socially natural," seem to miss the point. If we encountered a race of beings that had evolved a different (evil) moral code, we could surely be justified in criticizing them.
But a crucial part of Geoff's position seems to be question (ii). He feels that liberals will answer "no" to (i), and thereby have to leave morality out of the law entirely. But surely no one believes this. The question is about the function of government. Is government supposed to enforce moral right and wrong in general, or merely certain specific moral laws?
Conservatives might want to say that the law is meant to enforce all of morality. But I don't think anyone really believes that. Some important, and universal, moral principles are left out of the law. A great example is lying. Unlike with abortion, or assisted suicide, people as a whole agree that lying is wrong, especially in important situations. Cheating on one's spouse is wrong. One can even harm people by lying -- lying about an affair can ruin a marriage and destroy your spouse's life. But I've never seen anyone argue that lying should be illegal, or that cheating on a lover or spouse should be illegal. Such things are just outside of the government's function.
So what is the government's function? I tend to think it has more to do with protecting our liberties than with enforcing moral right and wrong. This, and not moral relativism (which I profoundly reject), is why I count myself a liberal.
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posted
Yes, good idea. Let's go back to the initial questions.
(i) Is there objective right/wrong? No. There is a very nearly (read: virtually) objective right and wrong that is extremely nuanced in having derived from biological, social and mental exigencies (in the latter case, rationality being the prime element) and the weight of historical practice. It might as well be objective, as it's as close as we're likely to get (we'll keep tweaking and refining it, of course). The ancient Greeks might have called this "commonplace ethics."
(ii) To what extent should right/wrong influence laws? Well, that's a toughie, isn't it? Laws, I think, are about maintaining the social ontology a group of people has chosen to live by (a contract with a series of rights and protections, etc.). It will overlap with the moral systems of the people in some spots; in others it will ignore those ethical strictures and focus on other elements.
To me the "bad" kind of conservative wants to make the laws line up *exclusively* with a particular moral code, while the "bad" kind of liberal wants to make them independent of any moral code (which is about the same thing). Luckily, they are the minority. Good liberals, conservatives and moderates all want to strike a balance: they differ as to what that balance should be, however.
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posted
Exactly. It is a contractual crime. We can't prosecute people for the violation of a moral code: we'd be the Taliban if we did.
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To answer seriously, fornication and sodomy were crimes that have been enforced fairly recently, although since Lawrence, no more. Adultery as a crime may survive, and if it does the contract-like aspect of marriage will likely by a critical reason.
Dagonee *In the sense of violating a contract being a crime, which is how I interpreted your usage. There are contracts that the mere entering into may constitute a crime.
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Dagonee, as I've said, law and morality do occasionally intersect, and there will be laws that attempt to legislate morality rather than sustain the fabric of a society. We aren't debating their existence, but whether they ought to continue to exist and whether we ought to continue making such laws.
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posted
I was responding specifically to Destineer's claim that few people are interested in enforcing (edit: some very specific) laws, not the desirability of doing so.
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"Destineer, adultery laws are still enforced even today, although rarely."
I think this indicates that many people aren't really interested in enforcing those laws, as he stated.
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My point was just this: you might think that our laws are meant to enforce all the moral codes we believe in, or you might think the law is meant to enforce only those moral codes we can all mostly agree upon. I think everyone should agree that neither of these goals is the aim of our laws. Almost everyone agrees that certain forms of interpersonal behavior, such as cutting off contact with your parents for no good reason, or humiliating someone who doesn't deserve it, are morally wrong. But no one wants to pass laws against these sorts of behavior.
Nor should anyone want to make these things illegal. The point of the law isn't to enforce the true morality, nor is it to enforce the morality everyone can agree on. It has some other purpose -- perhaps some communitarian purpose along the lines David Bowles suggested, or perhaps some more libertarian purpose like what I was saying before.
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posted
I think adultery is a crime no one wants to punish until it happens to them, maybe.
In terms of payoff, I know that in "Mormonism" at least, morality for the sake of a payoff doesn't do the person any good. I'm pretty sure this view is supported in the New Testament as well. By acting morally without the proper intent (love of God) we may have some okay effects of not hurting people so much but it is preferable to have true heartfelt intent. To me, morality means being motivated by some sense of good higher than the self- even if not God, it could be society or reason. But the idea is to have a standard of conduct that is not ruled by immediate circumstances, because it makes free will irrelevant.
When it comes to economic assistance policy, I recognize that the scriptures are very concerned that we assist those less fortunate than us, since everything we have comes from God. But the scriptures don't really deal with the idea of a government that collects from all to dispense (after its own operating expenses are met) to the less fortunate. For such a system to meet my standard of morality, government employees would also have to exist on a level of compensation equal or lower than ANY who are being required to pay into the system. For welfare needs. Common defence is another matter, but would ideally be modest enough that no one profits from perpetuating war.
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quote: In terms of payoff, I know that in "Mormonism" at least, morality for the sake of a payoff doesn't do the person any good.
This left me rolling on the floor in near-hysterics. Did you intend for it to be funny?
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"For such a system to meet my standard of morality, government employees would also have to exist on a level of compensation equal or lower than ANY who are being required to pay into the system."
Why? Do you honestly believe that policemen, firemen, postmen, psychiatric councilors and the like should be maintained at subsistence levels because our taxes -- and their taxes, mind you; they pay taxes, too -- go to their salaries?
posted
No, I wasn't being funny. It seems you are confusing first cause and last cause. Given that the Mormon view of eternity is continuing to work and produce rather than rest and reward, I'm not even sure I am up for it a lot of days. I mean, I don't even want to do the work I have here on earth.
Of all the helping professions you mention, who deserves to be less well compensated? If you aren't a free market capitalist, that is. (clarify who in general, not who among those professions. If you are a ditch digger, are you less valuable to society than the psychiatrist? Generally, I'd say not.)
quote: No, I wasn't being funny. It seems you are confusing first cause and last cause. Given that the Mormon view of eternity is continuing to work and produce rather than rest and reward, I'm not even sure I am up for it a lot of days.
*whispers* You may want to check out the idea of "payoff" again. Trust me: Mormonism has one, too.
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posted
I think she's saying that if your purpose in doing it is to receive the payoff, you end up not getting the payoff.
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I'd say that as a human being, you have an intrinsic value to humanity; as a ditch digger or psychiatrist, less so.
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That they are right does not, however, mean that Utilitarianism is necessarily a superior form of morality.
